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The Impact of Floating Exchange Rate Regime 
on the Egyptian Public Finance
自由変動為替相場制への移行のエジプト財政への影響
 Mieko Okamuro　
岡　室　美恵子　
要約
This paper studied the impact of shifting to the floating exchange regime 
on public finance in Egypt with attention to debt. The paper found that 
fiscal position measured by structural balance to GDP was rising during 
the period after transition to floating exchange rate system despite rising 
interest rates, rapidly tightening monetary policy against capital outflows 
and souring inflation. Then, the paper looked at the impact of regime 
change on structural balance to GDP. The regression derived from debt 
dynamics equation shows a positive and statistically significant relation 
by public debt on structural balance confirming the causality from debt to 
structural balance. In the second half of this paper, the stability of debt is 
analyzed. The analysis provides that the sensitivity of primary balance on 
debt is very large, compared with rate of inflation, nominal interest rates 
and therefore, debt is stable in Egypt.
キーワード：エジプト、変動相場制、構造的財政収支、基礎的財政収支、石
油収入、財政反応関数、Granger Causality Test、債務の安定性。
１．Introduction
　The demonstration against the government which started in Tunisia, 
2010 was quickly spread over the Middle Eastern countries. Egypt was no 
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exception. The President, Mubarak resigned in 2011. The government’s 
malfunction in the aftermath of the revolution resulted in a sudden fall in 
government revenue. Moreover, the emergence of the Islamic State, or IS 
in the region and the airplane crush accident put the Egyptian economy 
into deep troubles. The tourist arrival fell sharply and foreign direct 
investment flew out, which led to a shortage of international reserves. 
Consequently, the Egyptian government asked IMF for rescue. One of 
the requirements for the Extended Fund Facility, the rescue package, 
was shifting to floating exchange rate regime. Egypt introduced floating 
exchange rate system in November 2016. Upon the introduction of floating 
exchange rate system, the Egyptian pound (EL) depreciated from 8.7 EL/
US$ in October 2016 to 18.2 EL/US$ in December 2016, which accompanied 
with rate of inflation hiking from 13.6% year-on-year in October 2016 to 
23.3% in December, 2016 and hit the record high, 31.6% in September, 2017.
   This paper will first analyze to what extent the fiscal policy mitigated 
the adverse impact of exchange regime shift on the economy and then, 
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to examine how the exchange regime shift affected the public finance in 
Egypt. 
２　The Egyptian Economy
　2.1　Population
   The Egyptian population has been steadily growing from 20 million in 
2015 to 100 million in 2018. The annual population growth rate gradually 
slowed from 2.8% in 1960 but still moderately high at 2.1% in 2018, which 
is 15th highest in the world in the same year. The demographic structure 
of Egypt is still young as shown in the population pyramid of Figure 
2. The shape of population structure is becoming a bell shape in 2018 
from a completely pyramid shape in 1950 but still developing and far 
from stationary. In fact, the fertility rate in Egypt is 3.37 in 2018, much 
lower than the world average of 2.4, which is shaping the demographic 
structure of Egypt. Due to the same reason, the old dependency rate is on 
upward trend but is still at 5.3% less the definition of aging society of 7%. 
The speed of population aging, annual change in the share of population 
over 65 years old in total population is very slow at less 1% while the 
corresponding figure for the world is 2.3%. On the other hand, the share of 
working age population shown in Figure 1 is high growing from 55.1% in 
1991 to 61% in 2018.
   This population structure indicates the country will have a sizable labor 
supply due to high population growth and fertility rate, which helps 
the economy grow fast in the production side. Secondly, the demand is 
expected to be solid for sometimes in future because young families who 
raise children tend to spend more than otherwise on one hand. On the 
other hand, the country tends to be in short of saving and likely to borrow 
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from abroad, making the financial account positive while current account 
in negative in BoP. Thirdly, the growth of government expenditure will be 
modest since the country still does not have a smaller share in dependency 
population. From the population projection by the U.N., Egypt is expected 
to receive demographic dividend from 2040 to 2045. 
 
　2.2　Recent Macroeconomic Development
   The turmoil subsequent to the Arab Spring, the emergence of the Islamic 
State, or IS in the region and the airplane crush accident and lower oil 
priceⅰ put the Egyptian economy into deep troubles. The tourist arrival 
fell sharply and foreign direct investment flew out, which, together with 
capital flight, led to a shortage of international reserves. The net foreign 
assets quickly fell from EL108 billion in November 2011 to negative in 
September 2015, which led the Egyptian government to resorting the 
rescue package, Extended Fund Facility or EFFⅱ for US$ 12 billion, by 
IMF in November 2016. One of the requirements for the EFF was shifting 
to floating exchange rate regime. Egypt introduced floating exchange rate 
system in November 2016. Upon the introduction of floating exchange rate 
system, the Egyptian pound (EL) depreciated and the depreciation was 
accelerated from 8.7 EL/US$ in October 2016 to 18.2 EL/US$ in December 
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2016 with a tail wind of capital outflows from emerging markets and 
back to the US market triggered by tightening of monetary policy by 
Federal Reserve Board. A rapid depreciation of the Egyptian Pound led to 
hiking in inflation hiked. The rate of inflation rose from 13.6% year-on-
year in October 2016 to 23.3% in December, 2016 and hit the record high, 
31.6% in September, 2017. The rate inflation was accelerated by reducing 
fuel subsidy which started in 2013/14 toward 2018/19 and gradual rise 
in oil price from US$ 45.3 per barrel in November to US$ 76.7 per barrel 
in September 2016.  However, as the international reserves bounced back 
due to additional international reserves from EFF, exchange rates were 
stabilized around EL 17 per US$ and rates of inflation also fell to a single 
digit at around 7.5% in August 2019. 
 
   The impact of turmoil in exchange rates did not affect the real sector 
of the economy. The period average of quarterly GDP growth rates and 
standard deviation of the quarterly GDP growth rates for the pre-Arab 
Spring period from Q1 in 2004 to Q4 in 2010 are, 5.5% and 1.4%, respectively. 
The corresponding figures for the post Arab Spring period for Q1 in 2011 
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to Q3 in 2016 are 3.1% and 1.8%, lower in growth and high in fluctuation 
due to the turmoil subsequent to the Arab Spring. These figures under 
the floating exchange rate regime are 8.5% and 5.7%, respectively, showing 
much better economic performance while its fluctuation is also much 
high. In fact, while GDP growth rates fell from 4.5% year-on-year (y-o-y) 
in Q3, 2016 up on the regime change, growth rates gradually rose from 
3.9% in Q4, 2016 to 5.6% in Q3, 2017 and then skyrocketed recording two 
digit growth rates for three consecutive quarters from Q1 to Q4 before 
it stabilizes at around 5.8%, still much higher than the pre Arab Spring 
era of 5.5% above. Different from financial indicators such as inflation 
and exchange rates, the regime shift did not affect the real sector but 
accelerated economic growth. 
 
   Looking at the structure of the economy on demand side, traditionally, 
the Egyptian economy is driven by exports as the Figure shows. Exports 
were the chief engine of the economic growth for the great moderation 
period before 2008. However, after the global financial crisis, exports 
lost its significance in view of contribution to GDP. Its contribution was 
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negative in the post Arab spring period. This picture changes up on the 
introduction of a floating exchange rate with exports shooting up 8.3% in 
contribution to GDP from previously negative contribution while imports 
also reacted as much as exports. There seems to be no fall in imports which 
is normally expected during a large depreciation in the Egyptian pound. 
From Q4 in 2016 to Q3 in 2017, contributions both in exports and imports 
are very high. Then, contributions by exports and imports became positive 
but not as significance as before. Instead, the household consumption took 
over as an engine of growth with noticeable two-digit contribution to GDP 
for two successive quarters, which also accompanied with a jump in GDP 
growth rates. This change in a growth driver and a sudden jump in GDP 
growth implies that substitution by domestic goods and service to imports, 
which enhanced domestic production, was on-going. In fact, growth in 
domestic credit to public enterprises and private sector recorded a two digit 
increases during 2017, which could have supported domestic production. 
   Another noticeable observation in the Egyptian economy in the post shift 
exchange regime lies in the rise in investment. The share of investment 
rose from 14.3% of GDP in 2015 to 15% in 2016 and reached 16.7% in 2018. 
This rise in investment was financed by a jump in bank lending to private 
business sector as shown in the Figure below. The Figure below shows 
a rise in domestic credit to private sectors from banking sector, which 
jumped from LE 520 billion in October, 2016 to LE 700 billion in November, 
2016 while the market interest rates was raised high in monetary policy 
reaction against a rapidly depreciating exchange rates and large capital 
outflows subsequent to a regime shift to a floating exchange rate. A 
rapid growth of domestic credit to private business sector continues with 
average annual growth rate of 15.6% for the period from August 2018 to 
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July 2019, compared with the corresponding figure of 13.1% for the period 
from November 2015 to October 2016. A rise in investment in the phase of 
a rise in interest rates indicates a large demand for capital for a structural 
change pointed out above. From views from investment and domestic 
credit, there is no adverse impact of the exchange rate regime change on 
the Egyptian economy. It would be permissible to say that an exchange 
rate regime change sends a signal and stimulate private sector demand for 
capital, which led to a structural change of the economy. In this way, the 
adverse impact of the exchange rate regime change was kept minimum in 
Egypt.
 
   Overall, the adverse impact on exchange regime change was as much as 
expected. After two years, exchange rates which once depreciated to LE 18 
per dollar in early 2017, is stable around LE 17 per dollar. Rate of inflation 
hit the record high at 33% in July 2017. However, it also gradually calmed 
down and now is 7.5% as of July 2019, which is much lower than even 
before the regime change. Quarterly GDP growth rate in January-March 
2019 marks 5.9%, which is much higher than 4.3%, the average for Q3, 
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2015 to Q2, 2016. In addition, current account balance was aggravated 
temporarily from -3.6% to GDP in 2015 to -6% in 2016 and 2017 but bounced 
back to -2.4% in 2018. In the next section, the paper will analyze the recent 
development in public finance and debt.
３．Public Finance
   Total revenue excluding grant for 2018 was LE 821,134 million and 18% 
of GDP. This is relative high in considering the corresponding figure of 
14.9%, the average of Lower Middle Income countries（LMI）. Tax revenue 
in % of GDP is 14.1%, higher than other LMI countries compared with the 
corresponding figure of 11.9 ％ for LMI countries. However, Egypt’s tax 
collection capacity is ranked at 159 out of 190 in the Doing Business Report 
2019 , scored 52.73 point while the region average of 74.52. Egyptian grant 
and other revenue(% of revenue) is 23.4 ％ while the corresponding figure 
of LMI countries is about 20％ and that for MENA excluding high income 
countries is 32％ . One of the largest items in revenue is revenues from the 
Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) while it has gradually 
declined from about 30% of total revenue in 2011 to 13.9% in 2018. On the 
contrary, thanks to tax collection reform, tax revenue rose from 57% of 
total revenue in 2014 to 76.6% in 2018. 
   Total current expenditure for 2018 is LE 124,408 million and accounts for 
28% of GDP, about twice as large as 16.3%, average of LMI countries. One 
of the notable features in Egyptian government expenditure is interest 
payment, 35.2% of total expenditures rising from 14.4% in 2010, much 
higher than 9.6%, average of LMI. Compensation of employee accounts for 
19.3% in 2018, which rose from 22.3% in 2008 to 27.1% in 2015 in the post-
Arab Spring era but fell rapidly. Due to fiscal consolidation as requested 
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by the IMF program, EFF, subsidies were significantly reduced from 29% 
of total expenditure in 2013 to 19.6% in 2018. On the other hand, social 
benefit was on the rise from 2% of total expenditure in 2013 to 6.3% in 2018 
suggesting that the subsidies were replaced by social benefits which is 
targeted at the poor. 
   In order to analyze the fiscal policy stance excluding oil revenues 
and interest payment, which cannot be controlled by the government, 
structural fiscal balanceⅲ and fiscal impulseⅳ based on structural balance 
was computed shown in the Figure below. Fiscal balance gradually 
deteriorates up on the Arab Spring in 2011 from -6.2% to GDP in 2009 
to -9.6 in 2011 and further to -12.9% in 2013. While the balance slightly 
improves in 2017 to -11.3% and to -10.5% in 2015, it again falls to -12.5% in 
2016 when the exchange rate regime changes. Therefore, the fiscal balance 
shows some adverse impact of the exchange rate regime change on public 
finance. 
   However, structural balance gives a different picture. The structural 
balance improves gradually from 2008 and continues to improve even 
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during the Arab Spring while it falls slightly in 2013 to -8.4% from -7.2% 
in 2012. Negative impact of the exchange rate regime change cannot be 
observed. The speed of improvement is even accelerated in the post regime 
change period for 2017-2018. The fiscal impulse also shows a steady 
improvement of fiscal stance. In fact, the fiscal impulse shows positive 
from 2010 to 2018 except for 2013. These observation on fiscal balance, 
structural balance and fiscal impulse suggests that the reasons for fiscal 
balance decline in the post-Arab Spring period lie in interest payment 
and oil revenues rather than fiscal policy management and exchange rate 
regime changes.
４．Flamework for Fiscal Analysis
   This section will first present a flamework for fiscal analysis and then 
analyze stability of public debt in Egypt. 
Dt = Debt Outstanding in year t、i t = nominal interest rate in year t、R t 
= government revenues in year t、Gt = government spending in year t, 
BALt = government balance in year t, PBt =primary balance in year t、OTt 
= Other capital flows in year t、πt = rate of inflation in year t, rt = real 
interest rates in year t、∆Dt =a change in debt in year t.
Equation for debt dynamics: Dt =Dt-1 + ∆Dt   (1)
Interest payment:  It =it Dt-1
Primary balance: PBt=Rt－Gt
Nominal GDP:  PtYt = (1+gt ) (1+πt ) Pt-1Yt-1
   Primary balance is defined based on government revenues, government 
expenditures, a change in debt and other capital flows such as privatization 
proceeds as below 
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   The equation (3) shows that when real interest rates are greater than 
real GDP growth rates, the debt automatically increases. The equation (3) 
also suggests that initial level of debt, dt-1 , also affect debt stability. 
indicates that rapidly growing economies whose real GDP growth rates is 
high do not need to have high primary balance to stabilize the debt while 
mature economies whose real GDP growth rates are low need to have high 
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primary balance to stabilize the debt. 
When ∆dt = 0, 
From (4), we can estimate primary balance as below
　　　　　　　　      pbt=α+βX +γdt-1+εt             (5)
X are control variables including GDP growth and real interest rates and 
the size of γ shows the sensitivity of fiscal adjustment to debt in t-1.
５．Regression Analysis
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   In this paper, structural balance to potential GDP is used to estimate 
fiscal reaction function, equation (5) above in order to see the magnitude, 
γ in (5), of fiscal reaction against debt and analyze the impact of exchange 
rate regime changes over the fiscal stance and fiscal management. 
Additionally, the impact of gross public debt to GDP on primary 
expenditures is estimated because primary expenditures indicates fiscal 
management better than structural balance. The estimation outcomes 
are shown in Table 1. To start with structural balance to potential 
GDP, firstly, all the signs are consistent to the expectation. The sizes 
of coefficients are stable in different equations. The adjusted R-squared 
are all adequately high around 96%. The Durbin-Watson statistics takes 
around 1.7 to 2, implying no autocorrelation. The F-statistics are all high 
in both regressions for structural balance to potential GDP and primary 
expenditure to GDP. Therefore, the estimation outcomes are robust 
enough. 
   The regression outcomes for M1 to M4 shows that gross public debt 
to GDP is statistically significant and its sign is positive. This outcome 
suggests that fiscal stance improves against a rise in gross public debt 
to GDP with one-year lag and indicate that previous year gross public 
debt is one of the determinants in the fiscal policy formation by the 
Egyptian government. In terms of causality, theory does not suggest that 
an increase in the structural balance to GDP causes an increase in gross 
public debt to GDP because the relation apparently is opposite. Therefore, 
the causality for an increase in gross public debt to GDP leading to an 
improvement in structural balance to GDP is justified and as confirm fiscal 
discipline of the Egyptian fiscal management, reacting to the public debtⅶ. 
   Secondly, oil revenue to GDP has a negative sign, which indicates that 
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the Egyptian government increases its spending rather than it tries to 
improve fiscal position when the oil revenues increases. This is, to some 
extent, vulnerability and dependency of the Egyptian government to oil 
revenue. Thirdly, interest payment to GDP, which is effective interest 
rate of the public debt outstanding, is also statistically significant, 
implying that a rise in interest rates is adversely affecting fiscal stance 
of the Egyptian government. The lagged dependent variable is not found 
statistically significant, indicating that this year’s fiscal policy stance 
in Egypt reflects more on debt, interest payment and oil revenues and is 
independent on last year’s fiscal stance. The regression outcome found 
the dummy for exchange rate regime change and exchange rate are not 
statistically significant, implying no impact of the regime change on public 
finance. 
   Turing to the regression on primary expenditures to GDP, the signs 
are all consistent to expectation. The adjusted R-squared are high at 
around 77% to 80%. However, the size of the coefficients varies in different 
combination of the variables although they are not too different. 
Therefore, the regression outcomes can be fair but need some cautions 
in translation of the outcomes. The oil revenue to GDP is statistically 
significant, supporting the finding above. When oil revenues increase 
by 1%, the government tends to increase its spending by 0.5 to 0.6% and 
aggravate fiscal position. The impact of oil revenue on fiscal policy during 
2007-2018 in the Egyptian government is considered large. Unemployment 
is also found statistically significant as social spending is one of the 
current expenditure items. The impact of unemployment is large since 
the regression outcome above shows that 1% increase in unemployment 
leads to a one percentage-point increase in primary spending in terms 
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of share to GDP. Unemployment is one of the determinants in fiscal 
policy formulation in Egypt. The regression also found that the primary 
spending increases as rate of inflation rise. 
   Moreover, slightly different from the regression above, the lagged 
dependent variable is found statistically significant, which shows some 
consistency in government policy or weak degree of autonomy in spending 
policy. However, since t-values for the lagged dependent variable is not 
high enough and it loses statistical significance when other variables such 
as dummy for exchange rate regime changes are added. While there are 
some evidences such as a large share of interest payment accounting for 
a third of total current expenditure, the regression does not show robust 
evidence on rigidity of primary expenditures. 
   Dummy for exchange rate regime change is statistically significant 
when the lagged dependent variable is removed, showing a turmoil 
stemming from the regime change had a collateral damage on the economy 
which increased government spending. The size of coefficient suggests 
that the primary spending during the post-exchange rate regime change 
is higher than before by 5 percentage points in terms of share to GDP. 
The regression outcomes do not show a statistically significant impact 
of exchange rate on primary spending with t-value, not high enough. In 
addition, its sign is negative, indicating that primary spending increased 
as the Egyptian Pound depreciates as opposed to expectation. 
   The regression outcomes did not confirm the impact of lagged and 
current gross public debt to GDP on primary spending. Therefore, Granger 
Causality Test was conducted in Table 2. The Granger Causality confirms 
the causal relation by gross public debt to GDP on primary spending. 
   Overall, the outcomes from two regression exercise suggest that the 
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impact of exchange rate regime change did not affect the fiscal position of 
the Egyptian government while its to some extent affected public spending 
for collateral damages accompanying with the regime changes. 
 
６．Debt Stability
   Now, the paper analyzes the stability of Egyptian public debt based on 
the theoretical exercise and regression outcomes above. The equation (4) 
is a demarcation line and shows the relation between debt(-1) and primary 
balance, both of which make debt stable, no increase and no decrease and 
is described in the blue line in the charts below. In the area above the 
demarcation line, the primary balance is larger than　　　　, the primary 
balance that stabilize the debt and that is why the debt falls. On the 
other hand, in the area below the demarcation line, the primary balance 
is smaller than 　　　　the primary balance which stabilize the debt and 
that is why the debt rises. 
   The red line is based on the equation (5) show the relation between 
primary balance and debt when the equation (5) is expressed in two-
dimensional space consisting of primary balance in a vertical axis and debt 
in a horizontal axis. The relation between primary balance and public debt 
in the equation (5) in a two-dimensional space is defined as: 
　　　　　　　      pbt=γdt-1　　　　　　　　　　(6)
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   The equation (6), the red line, is a fiscal reaction function to public deb 
of the Egyptian government, estimated by the regression above. The large 
γ and steep slope indicates that the government is very reactive to public 
debt. The intersection of the reaction function and the demarcation line 
indicates that the change of debt is zero. This does not necessarily confirm 
that the debt is stable.
 
   When the slope of the reaction function, the red line, is greater than that 
of the blue line, this case is shown in the chart on the left-hand side. In this 
case, when debt is smaller than, d*, the debt level at the intersection where 
the change of debt is zero, the debt increases because the primary balance 
in the area left to d* is smaller than debt-stabilizing primary balance pb*. 
On the other hand, when debt is larger than, d*, which is in the area right 
to d*, the debt falls because the primary balance derived from the fiscal 
reaction function is larger than the debt stabilizing primary balance, 
pb*. Any deviation of debt to the left from d* can be reacted by relaxing 
primary balance. Any deviation of debt to the right from d* can be reacted 
by tightening primary balance. Therefore, this case suggests that the debt 
will revert to d*. 
   On the other hand, in the case that the slope of the reaction function 
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is smaller than that of the blue line shown in the chart on the left-hand 
side, when debt is smaller than, d*, the debt decreases because the primary 
balance in the area left to d* is larger than debt-stabilizing primary 
balance pb* while the debt rises when the debt level is greater than, d* 
because the primary balance is smaller than debt-stabilizing primary 
balance. Therefore, this case suggests that the debt is unstable and implies 
that there is less fiscal autonomy to accommodate fiscal consolidation as 
well as recurrent expenses account for large amount. In this case, d* is the 
debt limit and fiscal rules must be followed.
To analyze if the deb is stable or not,  　　　 is computed. From the above 
regression, the size of γ is 0.16, the average of four coefficients from 
four regressions. The average real GDP growth rate is 4.4%. The average 
nominal effective interest rate for public debt during the same period is 8.5% 
while the average rate of inflation for the same period is 12.7%, making the 
average real interest rates is -4.2%.  γ= 0.16 is larger than 　　　　=-0.082, 
which suggest that the Egyptian deb is stable.　Even in considering the 
historical average rate of inflation nominal interest rates and GDP growth 
rate beyond 2007-2018, the size of γ, 0.16 is large enough, indicating the 
stability of debt will continue sometime. However, the concern about debt 
stability will rise when the size of γ declines while rate of inflation calms 
down and growth slows down. 
７．Conclusion
   This paper studied the impact of exchange regime shift to float on public 
finance with special attention to debt. The paper found that fiscal position 
measured by structural balance to GDP was rising during the post-
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regime change period despite a rise in interest rates, rapidly tightening 
monetary policy against capital outflows and souring inflation. Then, 
the paper looked at the impact of regime change on structural balance 
to GDP. The regression derived from debt dynamics equation found a 
positive and statistically significant relation by public debt on structural 
balance confirming the causality from debt to structural balance. The 
regression also found a spillover effect of oil revenue on structural balance 
which excludes oil revenues. This is also confirmed by the regression of oil 
revenue on primary spending and oil revenue relax government spending. 
However, dummy for regime change and exchange rates did not affect 
structural balance. The second regression on primary expenditure found 
some impact of regime change and exchange rate on primary expenditures 
to relative weak statistical significance. Regime change and exchange rates 
did not affect structural balance but primary expenditure, which suggests 
that an increase in primary expenditure was offset by overall revenue 
increase. 
   In the latter half of this paper, the stability of debt is analyzed. The 
analysis found that the sensitivity of primary balance on debt is very 
large, compared with rate of inflation, nominal interest rates and 
therefore, debt is stable in Egypt. 
   In conclusion, all the analysis above indicates the adverse impact of 
exchange rate regime change on public finance is not very significant. 
Some adverse impact on expenditure side was offset by a non-oil revenue 
increase. One possible reason for this conclusion lies in the fact that Egypt 
was under IMF’s Extended Fund Facility program during the post-
regime change period, which contributed to containing fiscal spending. 
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ⅰ Oil prices fell from US$ 100 per barrel, August 2014 to US$ 45.3 per bar-
rel, November 2016.
ⅱ Extended Fund Facility (EFF) is designed to assist a country facing me-
dium-term balance of payments problems due to structural weaknesses. 
While EFF has a longer repayment period, the financial resources stay at 
the central bank and are not available for the government. 
ⅲ Structural balance is computed as below:
 100×　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 Adjusted 
real GDP is derived by HP filter. Adjusted real revenue is computed as below
  Real revenue×　　　　　　　　Structural balance eliminates those vari-
ables which cannot be controlled by the government such as interest pay-
ments and oil revenues since interest payment is the consequence of past 
fiscal policy and oil revenues fluctuates due to oil price. It shows current 
fiscal policy stance by the government. 
ⅳ Structural fiscal impulse is computed as Structural balancet-Structural 
balancet-1. 
ⅴ From dt =        dt-1－pbt(2), solving the difference equationdt =  　　dt-1－
pbt(2), gives 
　　　indicates whether the debt is explosive or stable.
ⅵ pbt* is primary balance which make a change in debt zero and corre-
sponds to d*on horizontal axis.
ⅶ Granger Causality Test is conducted between structural balance to GDP 
and gross public debt to GDP and confirmed causal and unilateral relation 
by gross public debt to GDP on structural balance to GDP, supporting the 
discussion in this section. 
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